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Interest Group Advocacy and the Power of 
“Magic Words”
DORIE E. APOLLONIO and MARGARET A. CARNE
THIS PAPER DEFENDS the validity of the magicwords test as a means of distinguishing is-
sue advocacy from other political communica-
tion. We find that the magic words test was not,
as the Supreme Court claimed in McConnell v.
FEC, “functionally meaningless” (McConnell v.
FEC 2003, 180). After reviewing the spending
and influence of organizations that made in-
dependent expenditures relative to those that
engaged in pre-BCRA issue advocacy, we find
that groups overall spent more on independent
expenditures and that groups making inde-
pendent expenditures were more politically in-
fluential. Moreover, several of the most pow-
erful interest groups engaged in both forms of
political spending. Representatives of these or-
ganizations, when interviewed, stated that they
made independent expenditures because using
magic words was more effective than using
pre-BCRA issue advocacy alone, even though
pre-BCRA issue advocacy included the subset
of advertisements now defined as electioneer-
ing. This belief is not only widely held among
groups making independent expenditures, it is
consistent with recent evidence suggesting that
advertisements that use magic words can in-
fluence the outcome of elections (Engstrom and
Kenny 2002).
Based on these findings, we conclude that the
magic words test made a valid distinction be-
tween different types of political spending, de-
spite the increasing use of issue advocacy be-
fore the passage of BCRA, and should not have
been dismissed as functionally meaningless.
INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES AND
ISSUE ADVOCACY
Groups and individuals can spend unlimited
sums on both independent expenditures and
issue advocacy. The Supreme Court ruled in
Buckley v. Valeo (1976) that to restrict such
spending was an unjustified infringement on
the rights to free speech and free association.
Independent expenditures are made by groups
or individuals (and since 1996, by political par-
ties) to expressly advocate for or against a par-
ticular candidate, and the test of express advo-
cacy has historically been the “magic words”
test (Table 1). Specifically, the Federal Election
Commission determines whether a communi-
cation constitutes express advocacy by using
the illustrative list of phrases suggested by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley (1976, 52), such
as “vote for,” “elect,” and “defeat.”1 In contrast,
issue advocacy, by not including magic words,
Dorie Apollonio is a Legacy Postdoctoral Fellow at the
University of California, San Francisco. Meg Carne is as-
sistant professor of political science at Rhodes College.
The authors are grateful for funding assistance from the
American Legacy Foundation (Apollonio), and Soropti-
mists International and Oberlin College (Carne). They ap-
preciate the helpful comments and advice of Bruce Cain,
Rick Hasen, Thad Kousser, Todd Lochner, Daniel Lowen-
stein, and the anonymous reviewers.
1 Subsequent court decisions have made it clear that the
definition of express advocacy includes those communi-
cations that “provide in effect an explicit directive” to vote
for a particular candidate. See, for example, Federal Elec-
tion Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. at
248–250. For a full review of this and other relevant cases,
see Corrado et al. (2004).
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INTEREST GROUP ADVOCACY AND “MAGIC WORDS” 179
avoids being treated as an independent expen-
diture.
Although advertisements funded by inde-
pendent expenditures may use magic words,
there are restrictions on independent expendi-
tures that may require organizations to set up
separate groups to make political expenditures,
and commit groups to communicating regu-
larly with the federal government, but not with
candidates. Certain kinds of groups cannot
legally make independent expenditures in their
own names. For example, if a corporation or la-
bor union wishes to make independent expen-
ditures, it must form a separate political com-
mittee. Independent expenditure ads and other
communications must be completely uncoor-
dinated with candidate campaigns. There were
no such coordination restrictions on the devel-
opment or use of pre-BCRA issue advocacy
communications. If an independent expendi-
ture totals over $250, the person or group mak-
ing the expenditure must file a report of that
expenditure with the FEC. Individuals and
groups that engaged in pre-BCRA issue advo-
cacy, in contrast, were not required to report
their expenditures. Furthermore, groups that
make independent expenditures must use
funds that were collected from individuals,
while corporations and labor unions that
wished to engage in pre-BCRA issue advocacy
were allowed to draw funds from their general
treasuries. Overall, the government imposes
costs on organizations that use magic words in
the form of reporting requirements and re-
strictions on outside communications, source
of funds, and legal status.
Political parties and interest groups turned
increasingly to unregulated political spending,
including pre-BCRA issue advocacy, in the late
1990s. There is some speculation that this
change in behavior was a response to the de-
creasing real value of campaign contributions.
Under the FECA restrictions of 1974, contribu-
tions to political candidates were capped at
$5,000 for political action committees (PACs),
and these limits did not increase with inflation.
In terms of purchasing power, a $5,000 contri-
bution in the year 2000 was worth only $1,731
in 1974, when FECA limits were established
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004). If the 1974
limit of $5,000 had increased with inflation,
PACs would have been able to contribute
nearly $17,500 to each candidate by the end of
the 2000 election cycle. In the meantime, elec-
tion spending continued to increase with infla-
tion. Moreover, the federal elections between
1996 and 2002 were the first in twenty years in
which the number of competitive seats in con-
tention exceeded the number of seats needed
to shift partisan control (Franz 2004).
Research on the 1996 elections suggested that
spending on pre-BCRA issue advocacy reached
a level roughly equivalent to a third of all
spending by candidates themselves (Thurber
1998). The Brennan Center’s report Buying Time
(Krasno and Seltz 2000) attempted to collect ba-
sic information on the use of issue advocacy.
Based on analysis of thousands of candidate
TABLE 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES AND ISSUE ADVOCACY
Coordination Restricted
Reporting with candidate source of Use of “magic
requirements campaigns funds words”
Pre-BCRA
Independent Reported to FECa Not acceptable Yes Yes, by definition
expenditures
Issue advocacy Not reported Acceptable No Not allowed
Post-BCRA
Independent Reported to FECa Not acceptable Yes Yes, by definition
expenditures
Electioneering Reported to FECb Not acceptable Yes Not allowed
communication
Issue advocacy Not reported Acceptable No Not allowed
aAmounts larger than $250.
bAmounts larger than $10,000.
Source: Federal Election Commission (FEC).
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advertisements and independently sponsored
political advertisements, the authors argued
that pre-BCRA issue advocacy was indistin-
guishable from advertisements that used magic
words. Research by the Annenberg Center at
the University of Pennsylvania reached similar
conclusions, noting that the majority of pre-
BCRA issue ads referred to specific candi-
dates.2 There were also claims that pre-BCRA
issue advocacy was supplanting independent
expenditures; the Campaign Finance Institute,
for example, claimed increasing issue advocacy
was “reducing both the incentive for, and rel-
ative importance of, independent expendi-
tures.”3
In 2002, BCRA imposed restrictions on issue
advocacy by splitting it into two categories. The
subset of advertisements that referred to a spe-
cific candidate was redefined as “electioneer-
ing communication” and was subjected to ad-
ditional regulation. The justification for this
change was the belief that the existing magic
words test did not make a meaningful distinc-
tion between advocacy intended to affect an
election and advocacy that sought to commu-
nicate a more general political message. BCRA
restricted corporations and unions from mak-
ing electioneering communications from their
general treasuries, and required that spending
be reported to the FEC if it were made within
thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a gen-
eral election and if groups spent $10,000 or
more in a calendar year. As the Supreme Court
later stated in McConnell, “The amendment
coins a new term, ‘electioneering communica-
tion,’ to replace the narrowing construction of
FECA’s disclosure provisions adopted by this
Court in Buckley.” The court went on to state,
“BCRA’s amendments to FECA . . . specify sig-
nificant disclosure requirements for persons
who fund electioneering communications” and
to note that the Act “restricts corporations’ and
labor unions’ funding of electioneering com-
munications” (2003, 176–177).
THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
Although research on issue advocacy is lim-
ited, there is enough information available to
suggest that groups using it will behave in pre-
APOLLONIO AND CARNE180
dictable ways. The claim we deal with specifi-
cally in this paper is the argument that the
magic words test was “functionally meaning-
less.” Advocates for this position based their
claim on two findings. First, they noted that
candidates frequently do not use magic words
in their own advertisements (Krasno and Seltz
2000). Given that candidate advertising is
clearly directed toward electoral goals, namely
electing the candidate, they believed this im-
plied that magic words were not critical in elec-
tions. Second, they noted that individuals who
viewed pre-BCRA issue ads felt that the ads
were intended to change their votes (Krasno
and Seltz 2000, Magleby 2001). They believed
that if the targets of issue advocacy could not
tell the difference between ads that used magic
words and those that did not, there was no real
difference.
The validity of these research findings is dif-
ficult to adjudicate, given that the authors did
not submit their work to peer review. In addi-
tion, neither of these claims deals directly with
the question of whether issue advocacy does in
fact change the way that individuals vote. Mea-
suring whether political advertising affects vot-
ing behavior would be difficult under the best
of circumstances. However, the claim that the
magic words test is meaningless can be tested
against the behavior of interest groups that en-
gage in political spending.
If independent expenditures that used magic
words and pre-BCRA issue advocacy had
equivalent effects, then no interest group
should have both made independent expendi-
tures and engaged in issue advocacy, because
independent expenditures triggered restric-
tions on interest groups that pre-BCRA issue
advocacy did not. Groups must in some cases
2 For example, they found that in the 1998 election cycle,
53.4% of all issue ads named specific candidates, and this
jumped to 90% close to the election (after September 1,
1998). As candidate mentions increased, ads that men-
tioned specific legislation or regulations (i.e., issues) de-
creased: such mentions appeared in 81% of issue ads pre-
September 1, and in just 21.6% of ads thereafter. See
www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/issueads. Veri-
fied on May 11, 2004.
3 See www.cfinst.org/studies/vital/commentary.html.
Verified on May 11, 2004.
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form a separate legal entity to make indepen-
dent expenditures, they must report nearly all
of their expenditures, and they can use only re-
stricted sources of funds. To make independent
expenditures, groups must run a separate, un-
coordinated campaign, which requires them to
pay additional overhead costs. However,
groups were not required to do any of these
things if they engaged in pre-BCRA issue ad-
vocacy. The proposition that both forms of
spending had equivalent effects therefore gen-
erates the following testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. No interest group will both engage
in pre-BCRA issue advocacy and make
independent expenditures
In addition, given that pre-BCRA issue ad-
vocacy should be inherently more appealing if
both forms of spending have identical effects,
spending on pre-BCRA issue ads should have
supplanted independent expenditures. The
only kinds of organizations that would have
made independent expenditures in lieu of pre-
BCRA issue advocacy were those that were po-
litically unsophisticated. Only interest groups
that did not know better would commit the ad-
ditional resources needed to make independent
expenditures if pre-BCRA issue advocacy were
functionally equivalent. On the individual
level, this would be comparable to buying a
widget for $2 when an identical widget sitting
next to it was priced at $1. Groups that knew
both options existed would never choose the
more restrictive option. Hence, the following
hypothesis applies.
Hypothesis 2. Interest groups that make
independent expenditures will be less experienced
and less influential than interest groups that
engage in pre-BCRA issue advocacy
In generating these hypotheses, we pre-
sumed that groups are essentially rational and
seek to spend their money effectively. These as-
sumptions are consistent with the vast major-
ity of research on organizational spending on
campaigns and elections. We tested these hy-
potheses, which are implied by the existing lit-
erature on the magic words distinction, using
the data described below and found that they
were not supported. Interest groups did not be-
have in ways that implied that the magic words
distinction was functionally meaningless.
DATA AND METHODS
Our data on interest group activity and in-
fluence were drawn from three sources: reports
of spending on independent expenditures and
issue advocacy, interest group influence rank-
ings, and interviews with organizations and
consultants that had experience with indepen-
dent spending. Limited information is avail-
able on interest groups that engaged in pre-
BCRA issue advocacy in any given year. We
chose to review spending in the 1998 election
cycle because although the Brennan Center re-
leased reports on pre-BCRA issue advocacy in
both the 1998 and 2000 election cycles, detailed
information listing the individual groups that
engaged in issue advocacy and how much they
spent was only available for the 1998 election
cycle.
Moreover, we believe that the decision to re-
strict our analysis to the 1998 election cycle of-
fers certain advantages. In the wake of BCRA,
which requires that organizations that make
electioneering communications (previously a
form of issue advocacy) report their spending,
organizations may attempt to create separate
entities, such as the now-common 527 organi-
zations, to hide their political involvement.
During the 1998 election cycle, when there were
no disclosure requirements for pre-BCRA issue
advocacy (including the subset of advertise-
ments now classified as electioneering com-
munications), there was no need to create shell
organizations to hide the involvement of par-
ent organizations—organizations that engaged
in pre-BCRA issue advocacy had no expecta-
tion that their contributions would ever be
made public. The Brennan Center research that
attempted to identify these contributors oc-
curred after the fact, and although organiza-
tions that knew about the 1998 report might
have expected to be identified in the 2000 elec-
tion cycle, there was no such expectation dur-
ing the 1998 election cycle.
For information regarding spending on pre-
BCRA issue advocacy, we relied on data gath-
ered by The Brennan Center. Although the data
INTEREST GROUP ADVOCACY AND “MAGIC WORDS” 181
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they provide regarding spending on pre-BCRA
issue advocacy are not exhaustive, and do not
cover the costs of developing political adver-
tisements, they do cover 75 media markets es-
timated to reach 80% of the U.S. population
(Krasno and Seltz 2000). The Brennan Center
report for the 1998 election cycle gives detailed
information on twenty organizations that ac-
counted for 98% of all the spending they iden-
tified on pre-BCRA issue advocacy.
Our second set of spending data cover inde-
pendent expenditures. Independent expendi-
tures make up a small portion of all campaign
spending, but they must be reported to the
Federal Election Commission, and the data on
spending by groups are considered to be reli-
able. For the 1998 cycle we took the top ten
groups making independent expenditures or
communication costs (the FEC classifies com-
munication costs and independent expendi-
tures similarly) but eliminated two groups 
because they only made expenditures on 
communications costs to members and were
not relevant to our analysis. Consistent with re-
sults from other election cycles, the spending
of these groups constituted over 85% of all in-
dependent expenditures made in 1997–1998.
This sample appears to constitute a small
number of groups, but it contains nearly all
of the relevant spending on independent ex-
penditures and pre-BCRA issue advocacy for
the 1998 election cycle. Only a small number
of organizations made significant indepen-
dent expenditures (8 groups) or engaged sub-
stantially in pre-BCRA issue advocacy (20
groups).
Next, we sought to determine the level of po-
litical sophistication of each group that had
made independent expenditures or engaged in
pre-BCRA issue advocacy. We defined groups
as being experienced if they were widely ac-
cepted to be influential, using existing rankings
of the top 100 organizations seeking to affect
national politics as our measure of influence.
We classified each group in the sample using
the 1999 Fortune “Power 25” list of the most
powerful interest groups in federal politics
(which, despite the name, actually lists the 100
most powerful interest groups). In the Fortune
study, groups were ranked based on a survey
of individuals, which included every member
APOLLONIO AND CARNE182
of Congress, Capitol Hill staffers, senior White
House aides, and lobbyists.
Finally, one of the authors (Carne) conducted
personal interviews with 18 interest group po-
litical directors and other staff. The indepen-
dent spending levels of these groups ranged
widely, as did their issue areas and their expe-
rience with independent spending. This sam-
ple of interest group representatives, however,
did not include any members of the indepen-
dent expenditure offices from either major po-
litical party, despite repeated requests for con-
tacts. To compensate for the unwillingness of
political parties to be interviewed, Carne also
interviewed six political consultants and other
political professionals. One consultant was
chiefly Republican, three were Democratic, and
one was a consultant for independent groups.
In all, this research included 24 confidential in-
terviews, which were done either by phone or
in person between October 2001 and May 2002,
prior to the implementation of BCRA.4
RESULTS
We tested the first hypothesis, the claim that
no groups would both make independent ex-
penditures and engage in pre-BCRA issue ad-
vocacy, by reviewing the groups in our sample
that made independent expenditures or spent
money on issue advocacy in the 1998 election
cycle. If, as expected, the magic words test is
meaningless, and independent expenditures
and pre-BCRA issue advocacy are functionally
equivalent, then none of these groups should
have both made independent expenditures and
engaged in issue advocacy. As seen in Table 2,
however, five of the twenty organizations
(25%) that engaged in pre-BCRA issue advo-
cacy also made independent expenditures. Fur-
thermore, four of these groups were ranked in
the top eight groups making independent ex-
penditures.
4 This research was approved in writing by the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, Committee for the Protection
of Human Subjects on September 28, 2001. Both authors
were affiliated with this institution at that time.
5744_02_p178-190  8/11/05  4:51 PM  Page 182
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
cs
f L
ib
ra
ry
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 S
an
 F
ra
nc
isc
o 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.li
eb
er
tp
ub
.c
om
 a
t 0
7/
08
/1
9.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
 
INTEREST GROUP ADVOCACY AND “MAGIC WORDS” 183
In addition, in every case where an interest
group engaged in both kinds of spending, it
spent several times more on independent ex-
penditures than on issue advocacy. Even
though the figures on issue advocacy probably
understate actual spending, the differences are
so great—in three cases, independent expendi-
tures were more than ten times greater than
spending on issue ads—that it is clear these
groups preferred to direct the majority of their
resources toward independent expenditures.
As a result, we reject the hypothesis that no in-
terest groups will both make independent ex-
penditures and engage in issue advocacy.
Moreover, overall, pre-BCRA issue advocacy
did not supplant independent expenditures.
The Campaign Finance Institute, as noted ear-
lier, claimed increasing issue advocacy was “re-
ducing both the incentive for, and relative 
importance of, independent expenditures.”5
However, the evidence does not support this
claim. It is true that since 1980, interest groups
have not generally devoted large portions of
their political budgets to independent expen-
diture campaigns, nor has independent spend-
ing accounted for a large portion of the money
spent on federal elections. That said, a few
trends in the pattern of independent spending
are worthy of note. In the 2000 cycle, groups
spent roughly $26 million in independent ex-
penditures, or about ten percent of the amount
they spent on direct contributions to federal
candidates. This is substantially more, in ab-
solute and percentage terms, than in any other
election cycle going back to 1988. Independent
expenditures as a percentage of total campaign
TABLE 2. TOP ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGING IN ISSUE ADVOCACY AND MAKING INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURES DURING THE 1998 ELECTION CYCLE (IN 1998 DOLLARS)
Issue ad Independent Top IE
Organization spending expenditures org
AFL-CIO $4,541,346 $0
Alliance for Limited Terms $880,067 $0
American Association of Health Plans $46,740 $0
American Medical Association $70,731 $1,758,132 *
American Renewal $92,232 $0
American Values Organization $60,305 $0
Americans for Better Campaigns $59,722 $0
Americans for Fair Taxation $1,131,494 $0
Americans for Job Security $276,280 $0
Business Roundtable $851,743 $0
Campaign for America $125,366 $0
Campaign for Working Families $0 $609,122 *
Committee for Common Decency $141,189 $0
Committee for Common Sense $165,373 $0
Committee for Fairness $140,639 $0
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee $0 $1,329,000 *
League of Conservation Voters $301,535 $1,335,733 *
National Abortion Rights Action League $0 $576,743 *
National Education Association $57,078 $1,380,931 *
National Rifle Association $0 $1,676,808 *
National Right to Life Committee $46,309 $1,290,349 *
People for the American Way $389,249 $0
Sierra Club $99,617 $112,109
Tort Reform United Effort $82,584 $0
We the Parents $476,796 $0
Although the AFL-CIO did not make independent expenditures in the 1998 election cycle, it did spend $2.8 
million in communication costs to its members, which are classified by the FEC with independent spending as a form
of express advocacy (and allowed the use of magic words).
*Organization was one of the top eight groups making the highest level of independent expenditures.
Source: Issue advocacy data drawn from Buying Time. Independent expenditure data drawn from Center for 
Responsive Politics 1998 Summary Data.
5 See www.cfinst.org/studies/vital/commentary.html.
Verified on May 11, 2004.
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APOLLONIO AND CARNE184
spending also increased slightly in 2000, again
to achieve their largest share of campaign
spending since 1988. Finally, three of the four
largest amounts ever spent independently in
Congressional elections were in three of the
four election cycles immediately prior to BCRA
(1996, 1998, and 2000). Independent expendi-
tures were increasing along with pre-BCRA 
issue advocacy spending, supporting the con-
tention that groups did not view these cam-
paign finance tools as interchangeable.
If it were true that only groups with limited
experience and influence make independent
expenditures, however, the finding that some
interest groups engage in both forms of spend-
ing would be less relevant. However, this ex-
pectation is not borne out. Table 3 shows that
interest groups that spent money on both forms
of spending were the most likely to be ranked
as influential, with all groups ranked some-
where in the top 100. Their average influence
ranking was less than 28 (groups are ranked
from 1 to 100, with 1 being the most powerful).
Next were groups that made only independent
expenditures. Although only half were ranked
in the list of powerful interest groups, that half
was even more influential than the groups en-
gaging in both forms of spending, with an av-
TABLE 3. ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY AND INFLUENCE RANKING OF TOP ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED IN
ISSUE ADVOCACY AND MAKING INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES DURING THE 1998 ELECTION CYCLE
1999 Fortune
power rank
Groups running issue ads and making independent expenditures
American Medical Association 130
League of Conservation Voters 660
National Education Association 9
National Right to Life Committee 8
Sierra Club 430
Percent Fortune ranked 100.%
Average ranking 27.8
Groups making independent expenditures only
Campaign for Working Families na
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee na0
National Abortion Rights Action League 42
National Rifle Association 2
Percent Fortune ranked 50.%
Average ranking 220
Groups running issue ads only
Alliance for Limited Terms na
American Association of Health Plans 48
American Values Organization na
American Renewal na
Americans for Better Campaigns na
Americans for Fair Taxation na
Americans for Job Security na
Business Roundtable 370
Campaign for America na
Committee for Common Decency na
Committee for Common Sense na
Committee for Fairness na
People for the American Way na
Tort Reform United Effort na
We the Parents na
Percent Fortune ranked 13.%
Average ranking 42.5
We excluded the AFL-CIO from the list of groups running issue ads only because it engaged in
express advocacy (communication costs to members).
Source: List of organizations drawn from sources listed for Table 2. Interest group power rank-
ings drawn from “Interest Groups that Influence U.S. Politics and Government,” 1999.
5744_02_p178-190  8/11/05  4:51 PM  Page 184
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
cs
f L
ib
ra
ry
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 S
an
 F
ra
nc
isc
o 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.li
eb
er
tp
ub
.c
om
 a
t 0
7/
08
/1
9.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
 
INTEREST GROUP ADVOCACY AND “MAGIC WORDS” 185
erage influence ranking of 22.6 The groups that
engaged only in pre-BCRA issue advocacy
were the least likely to be even ranked as in-
fluential; only 13% appeared on the top 100 list,
and the average ranking of those two groups
was 42.5, nearly twice the level of those groups
making independent expenditures alone.7 We
cannot conclude that interest groups that made
independent expenditures did so only because
they were ignorant of superior alternatives.
Although the groups engaging exclusively in
issue advocacy were the least influential and
experienced, we considered the possibility that
these groups grew into more powerful organi-
zations over time. Because our data cover the
1998 election cycle, we were able to look for ev-
idence that these groups constituted a new 
generation of organizations that were early
adopters of a superior method of political com-
munication. However, this hypothesis also ap-
pears to be false. Our research revealed that
most of the organizations that had engaged in
issue advocacy in the 1998 election cycle were
no longer active by 2004 (for a complete list of
the information we found on each organiza-
tion, see the Appendix). Nine of the thirteen or-
ganizations engaging in issue advocacy appear
to have disappeared. The two organizations
ranked in the 1999 Fortune Power 25 remained
influential, and one previously unranked or-
ganization moved onto the 2001 Power 25 list.
The remaining organization is an industry
front group that remains relatively ineffective.
Based on spending patterns alone, we con-
clude that groups making political communica-
tions, particularly influential interest groups,
value independent expenditures more than they
valued pre-BCRA issue advocacy. This evidence
contradicts most of the theorizing about organi-
zational behavior with respect to issue ads,
which consistently argued that express advo-
cacy and issue advocacy were indistinguishable.
If this were true, interest groups should have di-
rected their resources preferentially toward is-
sue advocacy, rather than toward more re-
source-intensive independent expenditures. To
determine why these organizations preferred in-
dependent expenditures, we interviewed repre-
sentatives of several organizations making in-
dependent expenditures, or spending on both
independent expenditures and issue advocacy.
The Supreme Court claimed in McConnell
that, “Not only can advertisers easily evade the
line [distinguishing express advocacy and pre-
BCRA issue advocacy] by eschewing the use of
magic words, but they would seldom choose to
use such words even if permitted” (McConnell
v. FEC 2003, 180). In our interviews, represen-
tatives of interest groups emphatically did not
agree that pre-BCRA issue ads were equivalent
to independent expenditures, or that they sel-
dom chose to use magic words. They stated re-
peatedly that independent expenditures were
superior to pre-BCRA issue advocacy because
in making independent expenditures, organi-
zations were allowed to use magic words. To
quote one PAC representative:
There’s a couple of different big advan-
tages [to independent expenditures] from
our perspective. One is that we can tell
people how we want them to vote. We can
tell them that we like this candidate be-
cause he is good on [our issue] or we don’t
like this candidate because he is terrible
on [our issue] and then we can tell them
that we believe that because of that they
should vote a particular way.
A political director of a widely known and
well-respected advocacy organization noted,
“Maybe some people use issue advocacy to tell
people how to vote, but we don’t. We never say
‘vote for,’ ‘vote against’. . . . With issue advo-
cacy you can’t really close the loop.” Similarly,
several groups mentioned that independent ex-
penditures allowed them to be more direct, or
6 The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
which was not listed as an interest group in the survey
of influence, might reasonably be excluded from this cal-
culation. If it were, two-thirds of the groups that made
independent expenditures only were ranked in the top
100 most influential groups. This is particularly note-
worthy because very few organizations make indepen-
dent expenditures, and they make up a small portion of
all campaign spending.
7 We excluded the AFL-CIO from the list of groups en-
gaging only in issue advocacy because it also spent a sub-
stantial amount on communication costs to members, a
form of express advocacy. Had we included the AFL-CIO,
however, the results would change only moderately; 20%
of groups would have been Fortune-ranked, and the av-
erage ranking would have been 30.
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aggressive, with both their language and im-
agery. When asked about the advantages of in-
dependent expenditures relative to issue ad-
vocacy, one PAC political staffer noted:
You can just be much more direct [with
independent expenditures] than you can
with an issue advocacy campaign where
you’re doing public education on the is-
sues and where the candidates stand on
the issues. So there’s elements of both that
make them somewhat similar but in the
end I think you can be a little more direct
and a little edgier with an IEC [indepen-
dent expenditure campaign] than you can
with issue advocacy.
Another summarized why her group made in-
dependent expenditures in this exchange:
Interviewee: We just made the decision
that because we have relatively limited
PAC funds . . . that we wanted to use those
funds to be, to give directly to the candi-
dates. Or to do independent expenditures
because we believe that for us those are
the most effective things we can do to get
the right folks elected.
Q: More bang for your buck?
Interviewee: Yeah.
In the experience of the most influential inter-
est groups, advertisements that could not use
magic words were a less effective way to com-
municate political messages.
These comments made by organizational
representatives are consistent with research on
groups that make independent expenditures.
Most of these groups are advocacy or single-is-
sue type organizations, primarily concerned
with electing friends and defeating foes of their
particular issues (Carne and Apollonio 2003).
The majority of groups are primarily concerned
with electoral goals, and it is not surprising that
such organizations most value being able to in-
struct individuals how to vote.
Given these results, we reconsidered the re-
search underlying the claim that independent
expenditures and issue advocacy both consti-
tute a form of express advocacy. This conclu-
sion does not reflect the local reality of orga-
nizations that actually engage in political
spending. Review of the two claims underly-
ing the argument that the two kinds of inde-
pendent spending are indistinguishable made
it apparent that neither claim objectively mea-
sures the distinction between issue advocacy
and express advocacy. Candidates may not al-
ways use magic words in their own ads, but as
we explain below, candidate ads are an inap-
propriate comparison for establishing election-
eering intent. And although individuals may
have believed that pre-BCRA issue ads were at-
tempting to change their votes, this belief does
not mean that pre-BCRA issue ads were effec-
tive in actually getting them to do so. Neither
claim directly addresses the fundamental justi-
fication for the distinction between express ad-
vocacy and issue advocacy, which was the ex-
pectation that using magic words will affect
electoral outcomes.
The argument that candidates frequently do
not use magic words in their own advertise-
ments is the major ground for the claim that
the magic words test protecting pre-BCRA is-
sue advocacy was meaningless. It is obvious
that candidates are seeking election, and so
their behavior was viewed as the “gold stan-
dard” for efforts to influence voting behavior.
However, candidates campaigning for office
are not simply begging relentlessly for votes,
and their campaigns are not a good compari-
son case for express advocacy. Most candidates
face the problem of gaining or regaining name
recognition, and spend a significant portion of
their campaigns introducing themselves to vot-
ers before they move to asking for their votes.
A candidate that moves immediately toward
pleading for votes before achieving sufficient
name recognition risks alienating potential vot-
ers. Furthermore, a review of advertising by all
candidates neglects the fact that not all candi-
dates face serious opposition. Ample research
suggests that high-quality candidates are
drawn primarily to open seat races, while in-
cumbents running for re-election typically face
less serious candidates (Canon 1993, Jacobson
1997). However, incumbents seek re-election in
the vast majority of Congressional races, and
most can expect to retain their seats without
APOLLONIO AND CARNE186
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INTEREST GROUP ADVOCACY AND “MAGIC WORDS” 187
running a competitive campaign or necessarily
using magic words.
Finally, an election happens at a specific
time. Asking for votes too far in advance of the
election is unrealistic, because people are not
capable of voting for the candidate until the rel-
evant day. Candidates that ask individuals to
vote too far from the election at best waste valu-
able campaign resources, and at worst run the
risk of confusing and annoying voters. As a re-
sult, a normal advertising campaign for a can-
didate should not use magic words until some-
time near the election. This does not mean,
however, that magic words are ineffective. If
magic words were in fact ineffective, this
would be observed when candidates in com-
petitive races failed to use any magic words in
the week prior to the election.
Groups that want to see a particular candi-
date elected or defeated have the same incen-
tives. In one interview, an interest group rep-
resentative volunteered that independent
expenditures were important to the group be-
cause issue advocacy was most appropriate in
the months long before the election, while in-
dependent expenditures were the best way to
communicate a message to potential voters
near the date of the election.
We tend to do [independent expenditure
campaigns] I guess probably late. It just
depends on where we are in the cycle and
how things are shaping up. I think in part
you want to wait to see how the race is
breaking down. . . . Our issue advocacy
program actually usually starts in late
spring or early summer. . . . They do tend
to start earlier than our IECs because of
the different program.
Other interviewees echoed the sentiment that
issue advocacy and independent expenditures
were different tools, and most useful at differ-
ent times in the election cycle. An analysis of
the reports of independent expenditures of the
ten highest spending groups filed with the FEC
in 2000 confirmed data from the interviews. It
showed that the vast majority of independent
expenditure dollars were spent in the month
preceding the general election. This finding
suggests that the 30- and 60-day disclosure re-
quirements imposed by BCRA may have been
gratuitous. However, BCRA’s other restric-
tions, such as the reclassification of some pre-
BCRA issue advocacy into “electioneering
communications,” may still have affected or-
ganizational behavior, though the justification
for doing so—the belief that this advocacy had
the same effect as independent expenditures—
appears to have been tenuous.
Notably, the interviews suggest that even if
magic words were in fact useless in affecting
voting decisions, interest groups would still en-
gage in independent spending because organi-
zations believe (rightly or wrongly) that magic
words are important. Nearly all the group rep-
resentatives expressed the opinion that their or-
ganization’s involvement via independent ex-
penditures could swing vote totals by two to
three percentage points—the difference be-
tween winning and losing in highly contested
races.8 No serious candidate or interest group
would be willing to be the first mover in giv-
ing up the use of magic words, because the risk
of losing the election is too great. Pre-BCRA is-
sue advocacy may also have affected voting 
behavior, but this does not suggest that inde-
pendent expenditures and pre-BCRA issue 
advocacy were equivalent. Given the prefer-
ence interest groups showed for independent
expenditures, as seen by both their spending
patterns and by direct testimony from their
representatives, advertisements that use magic
words were not equivalent to those that do not.
The second strand of research justifying the
claim that pre-BCRA issue advocacy was
equivalent to express advocacy relies on the
opinions of potential voters, who stated that
they believed pre-BCRA issue ads were at-
tempting to influence their votes (Krasno and
Seltz 2000, Magleby 2001). As a justification for
restricting pre-BCRA issue advocacy, however,
this argument is flawed on two levels. First, the
perception that issue ads are an attempt to in-
fluence votes does not imply that they are ef-
fective in doing so. Get-out-the-vote (GOTV)
drives are manifestly an effort to convince peo-
8 Unsurprisingly, the small set of competitive Congres-
sional races in each cycle attracts the most independent
expenditures.
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that the magic words test was meaningless was
used to impose restrictions on pre-BCRA issue
advocacy. However, based on the interviews
with advocates and a review of interest group
spending and influence, these restrictions were
unjustified. The Supreme Court stated in Buck-
ley that issue advocacy should be protected un-
der the First Amendment as political speech.
Although the magic words test proposed by the
court first appeared in a footnote, this method
of distinguishing between different forms of
advocacy withstands empirical review.
The research used to support the claim that
communications that do and do not use magic
words are identical in their effects is not well
suited to measure the effects of different kinds
of advocacy. Organizations themselves, despite
the expectation that powerful lobbies were tak-
ing advantage of campaign finance “loop-
holes,” did not abandon independent expendi-
tures in favor of issue advocacy; rather, they
increased their commitment to independent ex-
penditures at the same time that spending on
pre-BCRA issue advocacy increased. Although
independent expenditures make up a small
portion of most groups’ campaign spending,
the most influential groups in particular spent
dramatically less on pre-BCRA issue advocacy
than they did on independent expenditures.
Their rationale, which is consistent with em-
pirical observation, was that the ability to use
magic words in advertisements is too impor-
tant to concede in exchange for the absence of
regulation.
In contrast, the set of organizations that spent
the most on issue advocacy consisted largely of
groups that did not remain active in politics for
more than a few years. This observation is con-
sistent with other research suggesting that 
political spending that imposes few or no re-
strictions on groups may draw in a larger 
population of contributors than political spend-
ing that requires disclosure, imposes restric-
tions on behavior, and limits contributions
(Apollonio and La Raja 2004). All forms of cam-
paign regulation are onerous to some degree,
and limit the population of contributors. Ironi-
cally, increasingly restrictive forms of campaign
finance regulation may limit the field of con-
tributors to only the most powerful interest
groups, who already possess the ability to nav-
ple to go to the polls, and any individual con-
tacted by one would identify it as such, but
such voter contacts are nonetheless ineffective
(Gerber and Green 2000, McNulty 2004). Some-
times nearly all the wine spills between cup
and lip.
Second, the research that has attempted to
determine the effectiveness of independent ex-
penditures has found that they do in fact affect
electoral outcomes (Engstrom and Kenny
2002). There is no comparable research on is-
sue advocacy, but given the emphasis that
groups place on using advertisements with
magic words near the date of the election, it is
unlikely that there would be a significant num-
ber of post-BCRA issue ads to test such a hy-
pothesis. Even if magic words did not change
electoral outcomes, however, it is difficult to
imagine how to convince interest groups and
candidates that it is worth taking the risk of not
using them.
Organizational behavior is not consistent
with the belief that the magic words test is
meaningless. If the magic words were useless,
experienced and influential groups would not
have chosen to devote dramatically more re-
sources to independent expenditures than they
did to pre-BCRA issue advocacy. Interest
groups learn as they gain experience (March
and Olson 1984, Apollonio and La Raja 2004),
and influential groups would not commit to
one strategy when an equally effective but less
restricted alternative was available. Our results
suggest that political communications that
used magic words were in fact more effective
than pre-BCRA issue advocacy, even the sub-
set of pre-BCRA issue advocacy that was sub-
sequently redefined as electioneering commu-
nication. The Supreme Court claimed that the
magic words test was “functionally meaning-
less,” but organizations engaged in political
communications did not agree. Moreover, in-
dependent expenditures do appear to affect
electoral outcomes.
DISCUSSION
Our research suggests that the magic words
test usefully distinguished between different
kinds of political communication. The claim
APOLLONIO AND CARNE188
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igate complex regulation. In contrast, less reg-
ulation appears to increase the population of
contributors, which, in the light of perceptions
that government is run by a few special inter-
ests, is probably politically valuable. Restrictive
laws may lead citizens to conclude, correctly,
that political spending is the realm of a few
powerful special interests. Our research points
to the need to consider such unintended conse-
quences of a well-intentioned reform.
Moreover, the strong commitment shown by
political organizations to independent expendi-
tures suggests that attempting to restrict pre-
BCRA issue advocacy by additional regulation
was guaranteed to fail. Groups have a range of
alternatives available to influence politics. Ad-
vocates who wish to limit the influence of inter-
est groups or political parties in American elec-
tions should consider the critical questions of
how to place restrictions on both independent
expenditures and contributions to candidates, as
well as post-BCRA issue advocacy, including ad-
vertisements run by 527 organizations.9 In the
end, BCRA appears to have rejected a reasonable
method of distinguishing more effective from
less effective advocacy, while leaving the exist-
ing system of political advertising, with all its
flaws, largely unreformed.
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APPENDIX: STATUS OF GROUPS RUNNING ISSUE ADS ONLY AS OF 2004
1. Alliance for Limited Terms
No evidence it still exists.
2. American Association of Health Plans
Still exists. Ranked 41 on 2001 Fortune Power 25.
3. American Values Organization
No evidence it still exists.
4. Americans for Better Campaigns
No evidence it still exists.
5. Americans for Fair Taxation
Still exists; advocates a national sales tax. Ranked 84 on 2001 Fortune Power 25.
6. Americans for Job Security
Still exists, though not registered as a PAC; insurance industry front group.
7. Business Roundtable
Still exists. Ranked 26 on 2001 Fortune Power 25.
8. Campaign for America
No evidence it still exists. Founded by Jerome Kohlberg of LBO firm to advocate campaign
finance reform.
9. Committee for Common Decency
No evidence it still exists.
10. Committee for Common Sense
No evidence it still exists. Founded by Christian conservatives in Maine in response to com-
bat 1998 state gay rights legislation.
11. Committee for Fairness
No evidence it still exists.
12. Tort Reform United Effort
No evidence it still exists.
13. We the Parents
No evidence it still exists.
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